COMMENTS
BURDEN OF PROOF: HOW INTERSECTIONALITY CAN
INFORM OUR VIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION INTENT
REQUIREMENT
Kaiya Arroyo*
INTRODUCTION
People like order, and we find comfort in discerning patterns in objects
or ideas that portray similar characteristics—it is the natural way to process
information. However, when done inartfully, classification can lead to erasure and often happens when society tries to group people. These classifications frequently mask the experiences of the people who exist in a subgroup
of a larger category and result in overlooked needs of those intersectional
minorities. In the equal protection context, it can lead to disproportionate
discrimination of subgroup members.
Black1 LGBT people are an example of this phenomenon. As the LGBT
community continues its fight for equal protection, advocates have advanced
several arguments to analogize the LGBT struggle to other, officially recognized, “protected classes.”2 One particularly effective argument has been the
comparison between the civil rights struggles of Black Americans in the
1950s–80s to the current fight for civil rights faced by LGBT Americans.
However, while this argument has proven to be persuasive to many, it has
also created a perceived dichotomy between the Black and LGBT communities. This, in turn, has subordinated the identity of Black LGBT people by
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J.D., 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A., B.S., 2013, University of Alabama. I
am sincerely grateful to the generous and thoughtful guidance I received from Professor Tobias
Wolff that made this comment possible. Additional thanks to my Journal colleagues for their feedback during the writing process, and to George and Jeannette Arroyo for their unyielding support.
This Comment uses the terms “Black” and “person of color.” These phrases are not used interchangeably. The term “Black” refers to the specific racial minority of Americans, which does not
necessarily include recent immigrants from African countries. When referring to “person of color,”
this Comment includes Hispanic/Latinos, African/Black Americans, Asian Americans, and other
racial minorities. The latter term is used primarily when there is insufficient sociological research
on the specific Black population for a given fact, statistic, or situation.
In this Comment, “protected class” refers to a racial, social, political, sexual, or gender-based group
that the Supreme Court has recognized as deserving a heightened form of scrutiny. See infra Part I.A.
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typecasting the general LGBT community as analogous to, but distinct from,
the Black community.
By subordinating this subgroup in popular rhetoric, we lose the opportunity to fully understand (1) the problems facing the larger Black and LGBT
community, and (2) the way in which intersectional groups are affected by
larger power structures, which can also highlight the aspects of the law that
are problematic to the two subordinated classes to which the intersectional
group belongs. This is particularly true of the current debate surrounding
the LGBT community, equal protection, and heightened standards of scrutiny.
While many scholars discuss the importance of extending some form of
heightened scrutiny to the LGBT community,3 these articles predominantly
discuss the negative effects of the current standard of scrutiny in the context
of the LGBT community as a whole. The social sciences also devote significant commentary to the equally important issue of how race and sexuality
intersect within the LGBT community,4 but there is relatively little discussion
of how that intersection informs the heightened scrutiny debate.5 Unfortunately, this avoidance leads to the further marginalization of LGBT minorities and can delay the ultimate goal of LGBT equality.6
This Comment unites these two bodies of scholarly work to highlight the
problems of intent in the equal protection framework. It will discuss the way
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See, e.g., Nicholas Drew, A Rational Basis Review That Warrants Strict Scrutiny: The First Circuit’s Equal
Protection Analysis in Massachussetts v. Department of Health and Human Services, 54 B.C. L.
REV. E. SUPP. 43, 52–56 (2013) (arguing that the First Circuit should have applied heightened
scrutiny to discrimination against “homosexuals”); Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect
Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 386–90 (2010) (calling on courts to apply heightened scrutiny
to statutes that treat LGBTs differently); Mark Strausser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 1021, 1027 (2011) (“Arguably, sexual orientation
should be recognized as a classification triggering heightened scrutiny.”).
See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, It’s [Not] a Black Thing: The Black/Gay Split over Same-Sex Marriage—A
Critical [Race] Perspective, 22 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1, 8 (2013) (discussing how viewing the dominant normative aspects of the identities of “blackness” and “gayness” as “straightness” and “whiteness,” respectively, can subordinate the influences of the Black LGBT group); Russell K. Robinson,
Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468–69 (2009) (situating the perspective of Black “men
who have sex with men” in the broader context of HIV laws).
This may be the result of a rejection of intersectionality discussions by several prominent scholars
in the field. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1365 (2000) (discussing the hesitation of scholars such as Richard D. Mohr, Bruce Bawer, Marshall Kirk, and Hunter Madsen in applying an
intersectional framework because such efforts are “wasteful” and that they “Balkanize” and hobble
gay rights theory and activism).
See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1360 (explaining that a comparative approach to race and sexual
orientation reflects a “broader marginalization of persons of color . . . who are excluded from essentialist queer theories and politics.”).
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in which a proposed Kansas statute, the Kansas CARE Act,7 would likely result in a greater disproportionate impact on Black LGBT couples than either
heterosexual Black couples or white LGBT couples while still operating within
the constitutionally appropriate boundaries of the Equal Protection Clause.
Through this analysis, we see that Black LGBT people are ultimately left without remedy under either strict scrutiny (as Black people) or rational basis plus
(as LGBT people) because of the equal protection intent requirement.
Part I explains current equal protection precedent for challenging a facially neutral law by (1) describing the general framework of heightened scrutiny surrounding suspect classifications and, (2) discussing the special rational
basis plus analysis that the Court has often used in the LGBT context. Part
II provides a demographic snapshot of Black LGBT people in America,
which will provide a basis for analysis when discussing the Kansas CARE
program. Part III applies Part II to a hypothetical equal protection challenge
brought by a family harmed by the CARE program, highlighting the multiplicative negative effects the legislation would have on Black LGBT people.
Finally, Part IV advocates for a modification of the intent requirement in
equal protection jurisprudence in light of the difficulties presented.
I. CURRENT LGBT EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
At its core, the Equal Protection Clause protects each person from invidious, discriminatory action by the state.8 Because laws necessarily recognize
distinctions in the behaviors of different groups, not all equal protection
claims are, in fact, created equal. While legislative differentiation is a form
of discrimination, it is “discrimination” as understood without the negative
connotation with which the word is so often associated.9 As it is the purpose
of legislatures to make these benign distinctions, they are deemed constitutionally acceptable.
In order to avoid tension with the fundamental legislative mandate to
make distinctions and the Fourteenth Amendment’s goals of equality, the
Equal Protection Clause functions as a proscription against any intention by
the legislature to make impermissible differentiations.10 The following sections
discuss how intent informs the traditional equal protection framework and
the current rational basis plus review applied to LGBT people.
7
8

9

10

An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015),
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/sb158.
Julie A. Greenberg, Unequal Protection for Sex and Gender Nonconformists, in CONTROVERSIES IN EQUAL
PROTECTION CASES IN AMERICA: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 201, 205 (Anne
Richardson Oakes ed., 2015).
Compare Discriminate, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017) (definition 1) (“[T]o serve
to differentiate, to distinguish.”) with id. (definition 4) (“[T]o treat a person or group in an unjust or
prejudicial manner, esp. on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.”).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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A. Traditional Equal Protection Jurisprudence and Suspect Classifications
Typically, a challenged law’s survival depends upon which level of scrutiny the court applies.11 As equal protection jurisprudence evolved, it became
apparent that any classification seeking heightened scrutiny must be sufficiently analogous to the paradigmatic case—race—to be afforded heightened scrutiny.12 In subsequent years, a handful of groups have been categorized as “suspect” and have been granted different degrees of scrutiny as their
situations relate to and differ from the paradigmatic case. For example,
courts recognize classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin
as warranting strict scrutiny,13 while gender and illegitimacy warrant intermediate scrutiny.14
A court applying strict scrutiny is at its least deferential. It requires the
government to prove that a challenged law serves a compelling purpose that
cannot be achieved through another, less discriminatory, means15 and is narrowly tailored to avoid over- and under-inclusiveness.16 By contrast, the
court’s least exacting form of inquiry—rational basis review—will presume a
challenged law is constitutional17 and uphold the law as long so it is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.18 This deference also allows
significant over- and under-inclusiveness, which accepts certain unintentional negative effects on certain groups in order to accomplish the legislature’s goal. Intermediate scrutiny exists between the two extremes of rational
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12

13

14
15
16
17
18

See Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of Congruence,
Divergence and Judicial Deference, 16 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 591, 595 (1989) (“If strict scrutiny virtually
insures that a statute will fail judicial review, and if application of the classic rational basis test yields
the opposite result, then it would seem as if the Court’s only real ‘decision’ is about which standard
to apply.”). But cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in
theory but fatal in fact.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)));
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794–96 (2006) (questioning the notion that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact”
while still recognizing that only about one third of laws survive the standard).
See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976) (contrasting the severity and pervasiveness
of discrimination against women and African Americans with the treatment of illegitimates); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973) (comparing the historic discrimination against
and political power of women to that of African Americans).
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general
rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. . . . [T]hese
laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.”).
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 687 (4th ed. 2011).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 82 (2006).
See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (discussing the equal protection framework in the context of illegitimacy);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (low income); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (licensed vs. non-licensed opthamologists frame-fitting).
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basis and strict scrutiny, and requires the government to show that a challenged law is substantially related to an important–though not compelling–
government purpose.19
Notably, the legislature’s intent when passing the challenged law is a necessary component of each level of scrutiny,20 and it is the plaintiff who bears
the burden of proof. In practice, this burden is frequently insurmountable.
Legislators who avoid openly voicing their discriminatory desires can pass
detrimental laws, because “[a]n inference drawn from congressional silence”
is not credible when contrary to textual evidence.21 Even if some questionable statements are made on the legislative floor, the statements of a few legislators within the legislative history are often insufficient proof that the majority of the governing body shared those beliefs because such statements
cannot be imputed to the whole.22 And, in many instances, statistical evidence of a significant disparate impact is insufficient to prove legislative intent.23 With such high barriers, it can often become nearly impossible to
prove intent. As a result, many statutes that result in the subordination of
certain classes withstand scrutiny.
1. Rational Basis Plus
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people have not been afforded
heightened scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court24 and, as such, are
subject to rational basis review. Initially, when applying rational basis review, the lack of heightened scrutiny for the LGBT community as a class
seems concerning. This level of review traditionally favors the government,
as the Court has been explicit in its deference to the right of state and federal
legislatures to make laws.25 Under rational basis, the actual purpose of the

19
20
21
22

23

24
25

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1, at 687; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a drinking law that discriminated by gender).
See, e.g., Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991).
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of America, Inc. v. Div. of
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that
purports to explain one of the sponsors’ intentions for a particular bill were insufficient to impute
to the whole).
Statistical disparities have been deemed insufficient in the context of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, which is derived from the Fifteenth Amendment, but is similarly scrutinized for intent. See
Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit’s Heightened Section 2 “Intentional
Discrimination” Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 56–57 (2011).
See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (declaring that “a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy
by legislation adapted to its purpose”); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
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law need not be legitimate as long as there could be some legitimate purpose
that is rationally related to the law’s enactment.26 In fact, the justification
that a court uses to legitimate a particular law need not even be argued by
the legislature, but can be hypothesized ex post by the Court itself.27
Under this framework, homophobic and transphobic legislators could hypothetically present a bill with a clear bias for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans
persons, only to escape invalidation by providing an ex post, hypothetically
legitimate purpose when confronted by the courts. In practice, however, the
Court has not applied such a minimal standard of review towards the LGBT
class since Baker v. Nelson, which denied certiorari in a case appealing Minnesota’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 1972.28 Rather, the
Court has created an unofficially recognized but frequently used standard
referred to as “rational basis plus”29 or “rational basis with bite.”30 While the
Court has explicitly declined to grant heightened scrutiny to many politically
unpopular classes,31 it has nonetheless consistently probed the legislature’s
actual purpose when enacting a challenged law that negatively affects such
groups.32 The Supreme Court applies this standard in cases that challenge
laws which disproportionately affect LGBT individuals.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno was the Court’s first significant
deviation from traditional rational basis review.33 The case questioned the

26
27
28

29

30

31

32

33

(1952) (reiterating that the Court “do[es] not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare”).
See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88 (hypothesizing about why the Oklahoma legislature could have
rationally determined that only ophthalmologists could reframe lenses).
Id.
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) (dismissing for want of substantial federal question) dismissing appeal from
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). While the Court also denied that there was a
fundamental right implication in Bowers v. Hardwick, this argument was due process-based. The
equal protection claim was not preserved by the plaintiffs and was therefore not reviewed. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201–02 (1986) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (disagreeing with the
dismissal of the equal protection issue).
See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Gayffirmative Action: The Constitutionality of Sexual Orientation-Based Affirmative Action Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 755–56 (2015) (describing the nature and origins of rational
basis plus review).
See, e.g., Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80
(1987) (describing the evolution of rational basis “with bite” after the Supreme Court’s 1985 term,
which invalidated four statutes under supposed rational basis review).
While the Court in Obergefell did reference Frontiero, Zablocki, and Loving in its equal protection justification, pointing perhaps to a possibility of a heightened scrutiny statute, it did not in fact apply a
heightened scrutiny standard. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973) (overturning a facially neutral
law that negatively impacted “hippie communes”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432 (declaring a municipal
zoning law unconstitutional as applied to a home for the mentally handicapped); see also United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (overturning the Defense of Marriage Act as
discriminatory against LGBT individuals).
413 U.S. 528 (1973). In two previous cases, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court applied a more substantial form of rational basis
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constitutionality of an amendment to the Food Stamp Act, which barred nonrelated persons living in the same household from receiving food stamps.34
Under traditional rational basis review, the Government’s assertion that the
amendment was enacted to minimize fraud in the Food Stamp program35
should have been a sufficiently legitimate purpose to which the amendment
was rationally related. However, the Moreno majority rejected this claim and
instead looked to the Act’s stated purpose and the legislative history surrounding the amendment to find the law’s true intent—discrimination against hippies36—and disallowed a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group” as an illegitimate governmental interest.37
Throughout the 1980s, the Court applied this more searching rational
basis review to overturn a host of challenged laws. For example, in Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court declined to apply intermediate scrutiny to
the mentally handicapped but still declared a municipal zoning law unconstitutional by using Moreno’s “politically unpopular group” language.38 This
line of precedent was extended to the LGBT community in Romer v. Evans, a
case in which the Court ruled unconstitutional a Colorado referendum seeking to disallow anti-discrimination protection for LGBT persons.39 In declaring the law unconstitutional, the Court once again cited Moreno’s “politically unpopular group” language to hold that the law could not pass rational
basis review because the government did not have a legitimate interest in
denying these protections to a traditionally marginalized group.40 Moreover,
the Court went far beyond the traditional requirements of rational basis review by noting the law’s simultaneous over- and under-inclusivity,41 probing
the legislature’s actual animosity towards LGBT people, and dismissing the
Government’s argument that it had a legitimate interest in ensuring citizens
the freedom to associate.42
Almost a decade later, the Court became more explicit in its intention to
apply a skeptical rational review in LGBT-related challenges. In Lawrence v.
Texas, which overturned a Texas anti-sodomy law on due process and equal
protection grounds, Justice O’Connor stated that for laws harming politically

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

review, but these cases are often seen as transitional moves towards rational basis plus. See Nicholas,
supra note 29, at 756.
413 U.S. at 529.
Id. at 533, 535.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634–35.
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unpopular groups, “a more searching form of rational basis” is applied.43 Finally, in United States v. Windsor in 2013, which struck down the Defense of
Marriage Act, and Obergefell v. Hodges, which overturned the Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan, and Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage, the Court
ignored plaintiffs’ arguments to extend intermediate scrutiny to LGBT people while simultaneously scrutinizing the legitimacy of the law.44
Undoubtedly, the Court’s less deferential rational basis plus has served as
an important vehicle in the advancement of LGBT rights. However, the
framework retains the same problematic standard as all other levels of scrutiny: it is the plaintiff who first bears the burden of proving legislative intent.
As previously discussed, the Moreno court noted the existing legislative history
showed a clear intent to prevent hippies from receiving food stamps,45 and
Cleburne relied on the zoning board’s admission that the ordinance was passed
in response to the community’s “negative attitudes” towards people with intellectual disabilities as proof of an illegitimate legislative intent.46 In the
LGBT context, Romer,47 Lawrence,48 and Windsor49 all noted the existence of
an impermissible desire to harm LGBT people either in the legislative history
or on the face of the legislation.
Post Obergefell, this intent requirement will likely continue to pose a difficult barrier for the advancement of LGBT people. With legislatures on notice that it is now impermissible to discriminate against LGBT people on the
face of legislation, it is likely that these bodies will be more careful in disguising intent in legislative history and resort to the same facially-neutral language that has proven effective in thwarting equal protection cases in the
race context.50 More troublingly, this discrimination may also intersect with
43
44

45
46
47
48

49
50

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2608 (2015); cf. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d. Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the Defense of Marriage Act after comparing LGBT persons to women).
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
517 U.S. at 631 (looking at statutory language to determine that the law, on its face, “imposes a
special disability upon [LGBT] persons alone.”).
539 U.S. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (noting that, aside from criminalizing one particular
type of sexual conduct that effectively “brands all homosexuals as criminals,” Texas had in the past
stipulated that its anti-sodomy law “legally sanctions discrimination against homosexuals in a variety of ways.”).
133 S. Ct. at 2693–95 (looking to the legislative history, text of statute, and name of the Act to
discover the purpose).
Indeed, North Carolina’s HB2, colloquially referred to as the “Bathroom Bill,” is but one recent
example of this shift. The bill has been widely decried as having the practical effect of both stigmatizing trans people and foreclosing safe access to restrooms for trans people. See GAVIN YAMEY,
DUKE GLOBAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, POLICY BRIEF: HOW HB2 THREATENS THE HEALTH OF
NORTH CAROLINIANS, 2–4 (2016), https://globalhealth.duke.edu/sites/default/files/policybriefhow_hb2_threatens_the_health_of_north_carolinians.pdf. However, the bill’s stated purpose is to
provide businesses with “consistent statewide laws and obligations.” H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb.,
2d Extra Sess., 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3.
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other types of discrimination—i.e. race, class, gender, etc.—to create multiplicative layers of discriminations for these subgroups.
II. RACE, LAW, & BLACK LGBT FAMILIES
As previously mentioned, this comment evaluates the potential equal protection challenges to a hypothetical foster care law that, without directly eliminating same-sex couples as candidates, would negatively and disproportionately affect the group. This hypothetical legislation is modeled after proposed
Kansas Senate Bill No. 158, commonly referred to as the Kansas CARE Act,
which sought to enact a new CARE family program for fostering families in
early 2015.51
The Act is a prime case study to analyze an equal protection challenge. If
enacted, CARE would likely exclude most LGBT people from a Kansas foster
care placement program designed to provide greater monetary support and
parental discretion. It would also disproportionately harm potential Black
foster care families. However, this law would be multiplicatively harmful to
Black LGBTs, who, because of current precedent surrounding intent, would
be unable to challenge this law either on the basis of race or sexual orientation.
Also, unlike other laws that could also be challenged under other federal
legistion, the Fourteenth Amendment would likely provide the only avenue
of relief.52 While the federal government does pass legislation that affects
state foster care systems, the current federal framework is limited primarily
to creating funding incentives which ensure that foster care programs exist
in each state and that there are adequate measures in place to prevent child
abuse.53 These laws provide significant leeway for the state legislatures to
determine the ways in which the federal laws are implemented in their individual states and often allow states to choose whether to opt into federal programs.54 As such, foster care law is particularly well-suited to serve as a case
51
52

53
54

An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015).
When the CARE Act was under consideration, Congress was considering the Equality Act, H.R.
3185, 114th Cong. (2015), which would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity among the prohibited categories of discrimination or segregation
in places of public accommodation. If enacted, the Equality Act could have provided another
avenue of redress for potential litigation. For the purpose of this comment, I intend to focus on a
law that is entirely within the purview of a state’s jurisdiction. The Kansas Act Against Discrimination, which is the state’s main anti-discrimination legislation, does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(1)–(9) (2012).
Anne Lacquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 267, 286–90 (2009) (discussing the current framework of laws surrounding foster care).
See THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH CHILD
PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION, 1 (2015) (“The primary responsibility for child
welfare services rests with the States. Each State has its own legal and administrative structures and
programs that address the needs of children and families.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, THE CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT: 40 YEARS OF
SAFEGUARDING AMERICA’S CHILDREN 12–13 (2014) (discussing the financial incentives granted
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study for an equal protection argument because they are unlikely to be resolved through federal legislative means that can create non-constitutional
rights of action.55
Many scholars have already written on the problematic nature of the disparate impact faced by LGBT families. What is often overlooked, however,
is how LGBT families of color—particularly Black LGBT families—would
disproportionately experience this disparate impact. The disproportionately
negative outcome facing these particular families deserves to be considered
in the general discussion of why such laws are problematic. The next subsection will provide an academic, demographic snapshot of Black LGBT
families in order to provide necessary context when considering the potential
discriminatory impact of the CARE Act and how such laws cause a greater
negative effect on both the Black and LGBT communities as a whole than
may have otherwise been thought.
A. Situating Black LGBT Families into the Broader Black & LGBT Family Dynamic
1. A Brief Note on Intersectionality
Before delving into the Black LGBT family framework, it is important to
first highlight the way in which this comment discusses that intersectional
group. Intersectionality is the overarching idea that social identities “are organizing features of social relationships, and how these social identities mutually constitute, reinforce, and naturalize one other.”56 This can be understood as both an individual experience, as a way to better understand the
interdependent nature of greater societal power structures,57 or to focus particularly on those with multiple subordinate statuses (i.e., Black feminist theory).58 This comment uses an intersectional framework to focus on two subordinated statuses—those who are both Black and LGBT—to highlight the
multifaceted discrimination likely to be faced by this particular group in the
context of a proposed bill as a way to better understand the governmental
power affecting both the Black and LGBT communities as wholes.59

55
56
57
58

59

to states in exchange for general increased state-based legislation and enforcement, as well as explaining the varying degrees of state participation in the program).
Cf. Equality Act, H. R. 3185, 114th Cong., (2015) (proposing an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
Leah R. Warner & Stephanie A. Shields, The Intersections of Sexuality, Gender, and Race: Identity Research
at the Crossroads 68 SEX ROLES 803, 803–4 (2013).
Id.
See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (recognizing the inherent problem with ignoring intragroup differences and how those tensions create greater marginalization for the internally
marginalized within a particular group).
Due to the availability of research on the subject, this comment primarily focuses on Black lesbian,
gay, and bisexual families. However, some of the relied upon studies focus generally on families of
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Until relatively recently, the Black LGBT experience has been largely
overlooked in the discourse of LGBT equality.60 This erasure has many root
causes, including the staffing of advocacy groups, tokenization, and hostility
to intersectionality in either traditionally Black or queer “safe spaces,”61 but
is often attributed to the LGBT movement’s early comparison of its struggle
to the civil rights struggle of Black Americans in the 1950s–80s.62 This controversial comparison became the focal point for people who disparaged the
comparison as disrespectful and inappropriate,63 and continues to be an important comparison in today’s legal discourse.64 This comparison has created a dichotomy of sorts between the “Black experience” and the “LGBT
experience.”65 Recognizing the intersectional identities of Black LGBT people is necessary to deconstruct the stereotype that the LGBT community is
primarily affluent, well-educated, and white.66 Contrary to this popular ste-

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

color, which incorporate other groups who have experiences distinct from the general “Black
LGBT” identity that are not fully considered in this comment.
See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal
Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1363 (2000) (“[I]ntersectionality has addressed primarily, if not exclusively, the synergistic relationship between patriarchy and racial subordination.”).
Ashleigh Shackelford, The Politics of Erasure: Too Queer to Be Black, Too Black to Be Queer, FOR
HARRIET,
http://www.forharriet.com/2015/12/the-politics-of-erasure-too-queer-tobe.html#axzz43aERxHIh (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing the erasure of the Black queer
person in different spaces) .
See SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILIES [hereinafter POLICY ISSUES] 27–28 (2007) (describing the efforts of the
religious right for the past two decades as “pitting gay people against people of color” by constructing a narrative of “special rights” that are compared to civil rights).
Id.; Karen Bates, African Americans Question Comparing Gay Rights Movement to Civil Rights, NPR (July 2,
2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=419554758
(highlighting the differences between the LGBT movement and the Black civil rights movement);
Paul Brandeis Raushenbush, African-American vs. Gay Civil Rights Is a False Choice, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 20, 2014, 9:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-raushenbush/african-americangay-civil-rights_b_5353878.html.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2636 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (outlining the
history of slavery and anti-miscegenation laws as an “offensive and inaccurate” comparator to marriage equality); Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 36–37, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571,
14-574) (comparing the continued discrimination of the LGBT community to anti-miscegenation
laws).
See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1365 (noting the main criticisms of intersectional theory in this
arena as wasteful and likely to “hobble ‘gay rights’ theory”); THE NEW BLACK (California Newsreel
2013) (discussing the negative political consequences of comparing the Black civil rights movement
to LGBT civil rights struggles) .
See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1378 (“The theoretical backdrop to anti-gay and lesbian rights
discourse is an image of gays and lesbians as a “wealthy, white, privileged class, who, unlike traditional ‘minorities,’ do not merit legislative civil rights protection or heightened judicial review of
their claims of governmental discrimination.”).
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reotype, non-white people are more likely to identify as LGBT when compared to their white peers.67 The lifestyles of LGBT people of color—
whether they are Black, Latino, Hispanic, or Asian—are quantitatively and
qualitatively distinct from the affluent white stereotype and can create either
additive or multiplicative challenges on the individual with that intersecting
identity.68 A failure to include these intersectional voices in depictions and
understandings of what it means to be an LGBT person, in turn fails to consider how the impact of certain legislation will impact a large portion of the
LGBT population.69
2. A Demographic Snapshot
With this background in mind, we can now situate Black LGBT (BLGBT)
families within the larger framework of both Black and LGBT Americans.
As a general, preliminary matter, many BLGBT people more readily associate with their racial identity as opposed to their sexuality. There are many
reasons for this, but a predominant reason is that this group reports finding
a greater sense of community within Black communities than within LGBT
communities.70 Also, for many BLGBT people, self-interest is linked to race.
This often leads to a belief that equates making decisions that are “good for
the race” to what is good for the BLGBT individual and/or that individual’s
family.71 This is particularly true for young BLGBTs, who often balk at the
tokenism in predominantly white LGBT spaces72 and who recognize that the
visual immutability of skin color creates camaraderie in protesting racial issues—for example, joining alongside other Black youth to protest police brutality—in a way that their sexuality does not. In contrast, more than half of
BLGBT parents believe the LGBT community does not address their primary concerns: economic and racial injustice, and equality.73

67

68
69
70
71
72
73

Gary J. Gates and Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of Adults Identify as LGBT, GALLUP (Oct. 18,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx (showing
that while 4.6% of Blacks, 4.0% of Hispanics, and 4.3% of Asians identified as LGBT, only 3.2%
of whites did, which was found to be statistically significant in spite of the larger general population
of white Americans).
See Warner, supra note 56, at 804 (explaining the effects of systems of inequality on individuals with
multiple subordinate statuses).
Mignon R. Moore, Articulating a Politics of (Multiple) Identities: LGBT Sexuality and Inclusion in Black
Community Life, 7 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 315, 316 (2010).
Id. at 318.
Id.
See, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 61 (discussing her experiences attending queer spaces as a Black
woman).
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., LGBT FAMILIES OF COLOR: FACTS AT A GLANCE
5 (2012).
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For these reasons, as well as other societal factors that segregate communities by race,74 Black LGBT families are highly likely to remain in Black communities and observe a majority of the community’s norms. However, despite
the desire to connect with the Black community, it is an unfortunate but persistent fact that Black communities are more likely to resist LGBT equality and
their family members living as openly gay, lesbian, bisexual, or trans.75 Often,
this conversation is couched within religion, the idea of traditional family values, and the general repression of open discussions of sexuality.76
Traditionally, much of the Black community revolves around the Black
Christian Church. For many, if not most, the Church is the center of information, education, and resources, and the necessity of that community is often prioritized above other desires or needs.77 Whether social or professional,
it is typically an ever-present force within all-Black gatherings. And while
many churches have aggressively fought for gay rights, and many more have
come forward in opposition to government intervention harming LGBT individuals without supporting the “lifestyle,”78 there still remains a large portion of the Black community that wholly rejects the LGBT community and
family members who identify with it.79 Moreover, among the many Black
people who do accept their LGBT family members, same-sex attraction is
still considered a vice that should be managed or not discussed out of fear
that it may “confuse the children,”80 which can cause many Black LGBT
families and youth to feel isolated and suppress their identities.81 This, in
turn, causes many BLGBT people to remain closeted for fear of rejection and
perpetuates the group’s erasure.
Moving to family dynamics, it is first important to note that while the
perceived typical or stereotypical household model is a (married), two-parent
household with children, less than 25% of American families comport with

74

75

76
77
78
79
80
81

Alexander Kent & Thomas C. Frohlich, The 9 Most Segregated Cities In America, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 27, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-9-most-segregated-cities-inamerica_us_55df53e9e4b0e7117ba92d7f (explaining how federal segregationist policies in the
1930s, as well as the disproportionate economic fallout on Black communities, have perpetuated a
cycle of segregated zip codes).
See Tonyia M. Rawls, Yes, Jesus Loves Me, in BLACK SEXUALITIES: PROBING POWERS, PASSIONS,
PRACTICES, AND POLICIES 327 (Juan Battle & Sandra L. Barnes, eds. 2010) (discussing the ostracization of Black LGBT people by the community).
THE NEW BLACK (California Newsreel 2013) (discussing how church discourse framed the Black
conversation about LGBT issues).
Id.
Id.
See Moore, supra note 69, at 317 (describing the greater degree of express disapproval of homosexuality and its perceived immorality).
THE NEW BLACK, supra note 76, at 33:42.
Id.
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this family structure.82 While many Black families do conform to the stereotypical model, a larger percentage of Black households live with extended
family in networked family structures.83 While all groups have extended families that they love and support in many ways, a networked structure is distinct from the stereotypical household model because of the normalcy and
disproportionate degree of care and accepted responsibility towards nonspouses or -children. Network families accept and supply levels of responsibility and support to the entire system as commonly and as normally as do
parents towards their children in the stereotypical family structure. As Black
LGBT people are more likely to remain in their racial communities, the likelihood of being a member of a networked structure similarly increases.
Networked families increase the likelihood of a range of responsibilities
for any LGBT person of color.84 In addition to any biological children, Black
LGBTs are more likely to have the additional responsibility of parenting
other children within their network, including siblings, nieces and nephews,
or grandchildren.85 This in turn creates a unique assortment of housing, economic, and health concerns.86 Importantly, this also creates unique obstacles
in the legal sphere, as most of the policies which govern family life define
“family” as the stereotypical framework.87
Despite struggles with acceptance, BLGBT families play a significant role
within this framework and are actively involved in the creation of diverse and
healthy Black families.88 Overall, “an estimated 2 million children are being
raised in LGBT families,” and this figure is expected to increase in coming
years.89 Black same-sex couples, in particular, are more likely to raise children than their white peers.90 Sixty percent of Black female same-sex households include a parenting mother, which is nearly the same rate as married
heterosexual couples.91 As of the 1990 census, 5% of partnered gay/bisexual
men had children in their households.92
People of color are also more likely to be foster parents.93 Currently,
there are more than half a million children in the United States foster care
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Family Recognition, NATIONAL BLACK JUSTICE COALITION, http://www.nbjc.org/issues/familyrecognition (last visited May 21, 2017).
Sean Cahill et. al., Partnering, Parenting and Policy: Family Issues Affecting Black Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender (LGBT) People, 6 RACE AND SOC’Y 85, 87 (2003) [hereinafter Partnering].
Id.
Id.
Id.
POLICY ISSUES, supra note 62, at 7.
MICHELE K. LEWIS & ISIAH MARSHALL, LGBT PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES AND
PEOPLE OF AFRICAN DESCENT 123 (2012).
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 2.
Id.
LEWIS & MARSHALL, supra note 88, at 123.
See Partnering, supra note 83, at 88.
MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3.
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system, with over 100,000 of those children awaiting adoption.94 Approximately 14,100 children live with a lesbian or gay foster parent, which represents around 3% of total foster children.95 More than half of these same-sex
couples are people of color.96
Unfortunately, the high rate of fostering within Black LGBT communities is plagued with significant difficulties. While same-sex foster parents generally have the highest levels of education,97 that statistic changes when looking only at Black same-sex families or same-sex families of color. For
example, Black LGBT families are statistically less likely to have higher degrees of education and are more likely to struggle financially, with 32% of
Black male same-sex couples and 28% of Black female families living in poverty.98 The children raised in these families are also more likely to face the
double discrimination of color and sexuality when going to school.99
These families also face restricted access to health insurance.100 In many
states where the majority of health insurance is provided by employers, Blacks
are underrepresented in the percentage of employer-provided healthcare.101
This reduced access to preventative and routine care has led to higher rates
of disease and illness.102 Additionally, until very recently, many states have
refused to require the extension of benefits to LGBT partners (and only now
extend to married couples).103 Many LGBT families must purchase more expensive private insurance, which is a main underlying cause for why a disproportionate percentage of LGBT people go without healthcare.104 Combining
these two factors, Black LGBT families will likely continue to have disproportionately lower rates of healthcare, as the newly recognized marriage right will
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95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

103
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Gary J. Gates et al., Adoption and Foster Care by Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States, THE
WILLIAMS INST. & URBAN INST. (2007), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/46401/411437-Adoption-and-Foster-Care-by-Lesbian-and-Gay-Parents-in-the-UnitedStates.PDF.
Id. at 15.
MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3.
Gates et al., supra note 94, at 11.
MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
While the CDC explains that preventative healthcare helps to “avoid or delay the onset of disease
[and] keep diseases...from becoming worse or debilitating,” only about half of Americans use preventative services at the recommended rate. Those who underuse or forego preventative services
are those Americans “experiencing social, economic, or environmental disadvantages.” CDC, Preventive Health Care, (June 12, 2013), https://www.cdc.gov/healthcommunication/toolstemplates/entertainmented/tips/preventivehealth.html.
Tara Siegel Bernard, Fate of Domestic Partner Benefits in Question After Marriage Ruling, N.Y. TIMES:
YOUR MONEY (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/your-money/fate-of-domestic-partner-benefits-in-question-after-marriage-ruling.html.
MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3.

1030

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:4

still require higher rates for what are now pre-existing conditions that may not
have been present when the family was first created.
These struggles become more complex when they are recognized within
the broader context of Black family life. As previously discussed, many Black
families operate as networked families that include extended relatives. Isolation and rejection from family results in diminished opportunities of support
with all groups, but has a greater likelihood of occurring in families where
older generations provide primary supportive roles. Across races, acceptance
of LGBT family members decreases as the age of the non-LGBT family
member increases, which can cause added stress and increase the likelihood
of rejection in these families. Families concerned about ‘non-ideal’105 living
arrangements for children may be less likely to support the same-sex family
members within their network, which in turn can lead to a lack of emotional
and financial support that can prevent otherwise interested potential parents
from fostering.106
This outcome is particularly alarming when looking at the rates of Black,
LGBT, and BLGBT children currently waiting for placement within the foster care system. Approximately 24% of girls and 10% of boys aging out of
the foster care system reported a sexual orientation other than heterosexual.107 Black children are also overrepresented in the system—24% of children in foster care are Black,108 even as Blacks represent only 13.3% of the
overall population109—likely resulting from racist policies that remove Black
children from their families at disproportionate rates when compared to their
white peers for similar behavior.110 As a combined identity, Black LGBT
youth face constant, multifaceted struggles, including school bullying, lack of

105

106

107
108
109
110

The quoted phrase is used to depict the type of language used by some in older generations who
disapprove of LGBT sexual identities—not as an appropriate or correct characterization of LGBT
people.
Successful integration into life activities, of which fostering is one, requires, or is at least enhanced
by, certain factors. See Yvette Taylor, Complexities and Complications: Intersections of Class and Sexuality,
in THEORIZING INTERSECTIONALITY AND SEXUALITY 50 (Yvette Taylor, et. al., eds. 2011) (describing the requirement of capital and familial territory as influential factors in being a successful
“out” person).
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, SUPPORTING YOUR LGBT YOUTH: A GUIDE FOR
FOSTER PARENTS 4 (May 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/LGBTQyouth.pdf.
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2014, 9 (Mar. 2015),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf.
U.S. Census Quick Facts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE, at vii (2002)
(discussing the systems which remove Black children from their families through inferior treatment).
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acceptance within the home, physical abuse, and damaging ideologies that
diminish personal autonomy and self-worth.111
While there are a handful of specialized group home living options for
LGBT youth that respect and allow the foster children to express their identities, most are found in large metropolitan areas, and none can possibly
manage the thousands of LGBT youth that are currently in the foster care
system.112 Black, LGBT, and BLGBT youth would be well served by States
who increase foster care opportunities with families who understand their
unique needs. Laws that disincentivize BLGBT couples from providing an
accepting foster care environment to these particular children harm these
children regardless of whether those laws could be, in theory, rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
B. Kansas Senate Bill No. 158 – CARE Family Program
With this framework in mind, we turn to the illustrative legislation: the
suggested Kansas CARE program for foster parents. In early 2015, the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a substantial addition to the state’s
foster care program.113 The recommended program would dramatically increase the monetary compensation for CARE-approved families in relation
to all other foster parents114 and would provide CARE parents significant
autonomy over where and how the child will be educated.115 To be qualified
for such benefits, however, a CARE family applicant would have to conform
to the following criteria. The family must have:
(1) [Been a married]116 team for at least seven years, in a faithful, loving and
caring relationship and with no sexual relations outside of the marriage;
(2) submit[ted] to a background check on the [married couple];
(3) no current use of tobacco by anyone in the family’s home;
(4) no history of unlawful drug use by anyone in the family’s home;

111

112

113
114
115

116

See generally Benjamin Ashley, The Challenge of LGBT Youth in Foster Care, 1 TENN. STUDENT L. J. 47,
63 (2014) (calling for protections against harassment and bullying faced by LGBT youth in foster
care).
Id. at 62–63 (recognizing the specialized group efforts of organizations like Green Chimneys in
New York City, Gay and Lesbian Adolescent Social Services or “G.L.A.S.S.” in Oakland, California, and the Waltham House in Massachusetts).
An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015).
Id. § 1(d)(4) (“The secretary shall pay each CARE family at a rate substantially higher than that of
other foster care homes.”).
Id. § 1(f)(1) (“a CARE family shall determine how best to meet the educational needs of any child
placed with the family and shall have sole discretion in the educational placement of the child. . . .
The secretary shall reimburse the CARE family for educational expenses incurred for each child
who is not enrolled in a school district . . . .”).
The following criteria are pulled directly from the proposed legislation. In light of Obergefell v.
Hodges, it would be unlikely that any such legislation would use the “husband” and “wife” characterization for married persons, and so for the purposes of the hypothetical legislation in this comment, I have changed the wording accordingly.
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(5) no alcoholic liquor or cereal malt beverages in the family’s home;
(6) both [parties to the marriage] have attained at least a high school diploma
or equivalent;
(7) [at least one of the married adults], or both, does not work outside the home;
[and]
(8) the family is involved in a social group larger than the family that meets regularly, preferably at least weekly.117

S.B. 158’s purported goal is to “avoid additional trauma to the [foster]
children and give them a traditional home environment during the time they
are in foster care.”118 Senator Forrest Knox, the bill’s architect, championed
the proposed legislation as an initial step to revolutionize the Kansas foster
care program to incentivize “normal” families to enter the foster care system.119 Eventually, the Senator hoped that the CARE program would replace current foster care criteria.120 In light of Obergefell, the Kansas Senate
has held the bill, whose original language used “married man and woman”
rather than married couple. However, the bill still presents a particularly apt
example of the type of legislation that an LGBT family could encounter in
the near future.
This legislation, and legislation like it, would have an obvious disparate
impact on the LGBT community in Kansas. Obergefell v. Hodges, which extended the fundamental marriage right to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people,
is only two years old. As Kansas did not recognize same-sex marriages before
this decision,121 almost all same-sex couple applicants would fail to meet the
first criteria for CARE program parents. While it is possible that some samesex applicants lived in one of the very few states that recognized same-sex

117

118

119

120
121

An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1)–
(8) (Kan. 2015). The bracketed changes reflect an attempt to ensure that the bill’s language is
grammatically correct and reflects the ability of gay and lesbian couples to be considered married
in Kansas, which did not appear to be contemplated in this bill.
Joshua Vail, Knox Seeking to Pilot New Class of Foster Families, THE CHANUTE TRIBUNE, Feb. 17,
2015,
http://www.chanute.com/news/article_411f1820-b71f-11e4-acd5-3733c02c96d7.html
[hereinafter Foster Families] (discussing the testimony of 114th District Senator Forrest Knox at the
Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee meeting about the purpose of S.B. 158).
Bryant Lowry, Kansas Bill Would Reward Foster Parents Who Are Married, Faithful, and Alcohol-Free, THE
WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article9711821.html. Specifically, the Senator promoted the bill because “we need more normal
homes as foster homes. And how do you get normal? When I say normal, I just mean an ordinary
home with a mom and dad who loves [sic] the kids. . . . It’s no secret I’d like to see church people.
In Chanute, Kansas, there’s no synagogue. It’s church people.” Id.
Id.
State of Kansas, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/region_kansas (last
visited Oct. 27, 2015).
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marriage for more than seven years,122 this criteria would still disproportionately affect same-sex couples.
Moreover, the social and economic position of BLGBT people123 would
result in this legislation doubly affecting these families. As previously discussed, BLGBT couples are more likely to have networked families and so
are less likely to be married than their white peers and thus. Additionally,
because of the heighted hostility towards LGBT people in Black communities, open BLGBT couples are more likely to be ostracized from their families
and church communities, making them less likely to be a part of “a social
group larger than the family that meets regularly, preferably at least weekly,”
as required by the eighth criterion.124 Finally, due to the myriad issues relating to healthcare costs, familial responsibilities, and general access to education, BLGTB couples are less likely than both Black heterosexuals and White
LGBT people to have the financial freedom to allow one spouse to stay at
home full time.
III. RATIONAL BASIS PLUS AND DISPARATE IMPACT
A. Applying Rational Basis Plus
The qualifications for the proposed Kansas Care Act would likely eliminate most same-sex families from the potential CARE family pool. Section 1(b)(1) states that an applicant family must be comprised of a married
team that has been together for at least seven years.125 However, before the
Obergefell decision in 2015, which extended the fundamental marriage right
to same-sex couples, Kansas limited marriage to “two parties who are of the
opposite sex.”126 While it is possible that some same-sex Kansas partners left
the state to marry or were married out of state and moved to Kansas in the
past few years, for the majority of same-sex couples, the CARE Act disqualifies them from participation in the program.
Unfortunately, however, if an aggrieved same-sex couple challenged the
Kansas CARE Act, a federal court would likely rule the law constitutional,
even under rational basis plus, because of the intent requirement that has
been inserted into equal protection jurisprudence. Even under the Court’s
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As of February 2016, only same-sex couples from four states—Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, and Iowa—would comply with these requirements. State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay Marriage, 1994–2005, PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriageprocon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last updated Feb. 16, 2016, 1:44 PM).
See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(8)
(Kan. 2015).
Id. § 1(b)(1).
KAN. STAT. § 23-2501 (2014), http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/m/statute/023_000_0000_chapter/023_025_0000_article/023_025_0001_section/023_025_0001_k.pdf.
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most critical form of rational basis plus review, the plaintiff must still show
that the challenged legislation is not a legitimate government interest.
While Senator Knox’s statement may make the CARE Act may seem
evidently discriminatory, the Supreme Court has made clear that statements
made by one legislator cannot be used to impute an invidious intent to the
entire legislative body where there is general silence in the legislative history.127 Additionally, in Burns v. United States, the Court held that silence cannot be construed as invidious intent when the textual language does not require such a conclusion.128
S.B. 158 was introduced on February 5, 2015 by the Senate Committee
on Judiciary,129 and aside from one closed hearing, the only legislative evidence would be the original text of the bill,130 which read “a husband and wife
team married for at least seven years” rather than “a married team.”131 However, this alone would likely be insufficient to prove animus because, at the
time of drafting, the state had a law defining marriage as between one man
and one woman.132 While a plaintiff could argue that this alone is enough to
show “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,”133 the novelty
of the Obergefell decision would likely dissuade a tribunal from imputing discriminatory animus to a legislature that amended the law’s problematic language after Obergefell made the statute’s language problematic.
It is also unlikely that Senator Knox’s statements to local Kansas news
outlets will rise to a constitutionally problematic level. While his use of words
like “normal” and “traditional”134 families seem to be an employment of dog-
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See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of America, Inc. v. Div. of
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that
purports to explain one of the sponsors’ intentions for a particular bill were insufficient to impute
to the whole).
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991).
SB 158, KSLEGISLATURE.ORG, http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2015_16/measures/sb158/ (last
visited May 21, 2017).
Id.
An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1)
(Kan. 2015). As noted previously, this comment amended the original proposed legislation to replace the phrase “a husband and wife team” to “a married team” as the legislation was proposed
before the Obergefell decision.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2501 (2016).
United States Dep’t of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).

See Foster Families, supra note 118; Lowry, supra note 119.
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whistle politics,135 and his preference for “church people” (which, by the Senator’s admission, excludes followers of Judaism)136 shows perhaps a personal
prejudice, those prejudices prove the opinion of only one of several legislators. Supreme Court precedent is clear that the opinion of one or two legislators is insufficient to impute a discriminatory intent to an entire assembly,137
and is therefore unlikely to sway the Court away from its presumed deference.
A potential couple would be left with unwinnable arguments to prove a
discriminatory intent. While the Care ACT would likely disqualify many
families who would do an excellent job caring for foster children,138 this is
insufficient evidence to prove a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group. Both federal and state research groups frequently present data on the
trauma faced by children in foster care. If the legislature were to focus its
priority on the wellbeing of children and incentives to recruit new foster families, as it has done in virtually every summary or commentary by the bill’s
promoter,139 then there is no legislative evidence to show a desire to harm
the LGBT community and the constitutional challenge fails. Because the
plaintiff cannot prove intent, the constitutional claim fails, as mere disparate
impact is always insufficient.140
B. The Disparate Impact on the Black LGBT Family
While disparate impact may be insufficient to win a constitutional challenge, it does not mean that the negative results felt by impacted communities
are not severe. Here, the disparate impact felt by the general LGBT community described above is compounded on Black LGBT couples. While such
couples would face the same constitutional barriers as their non-Black peers,
the proposed law also creates significant hurdles for straight Black citizens,
and so the effect is compounded for Black LGBTs as members of both
groups. To begin, the statute frames the requirements of a CARE family
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Dog whistle politics is the employment of coded language surrounding political messaging that
would mean one thing to the general population but has within it embedded, targeted, and often
hurtful language towards a specific group. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE
POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE
MIDDLE CLASS (2014).
See Lowry, supra note 119.
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”)
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
See,e.g., An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess.
(Kan. 2015).
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)
(holding that intent is required to prove an equal protection violation).
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entirely discount networked families.141 The first criteria of the program requires “a husband and wife”142 couple (likely changed to a general married
couple after Obergefell), which is reaffirmed by Senator Knox’s desire to recruit
“normal” families.143 As previously mentioned, this stereotypical framework
negatively affects a large percentage of Black networked families and the
community’s cultural trend toward networked family structures. Happy and
functional families comprised of non-spousal/extended family units become
disqualified for the program without adequate consideration of the health of
the home.
Furthermore, the seventh criterion of the Act requires that at least one of
the married adults, “or both, does not work outside the home.”144 Both
straight and LGBT Black households are statistically more likely to have a
lower median income, making it less likely that one spouse can remain inside
the home.145 Many of these families, if not already disqualified by the first
criterion, would be disqualified by this rule.
Moreover, the proposed legislation’s eighth criterion has a particular negative effect on Black LGBT individuals, which requires that the family be
involved in a social group “larger than the family that meets regularly.”146
Both the plain language of the text and Senator Knox allude to a desire for
“churchgoing” people to be involved in the CARE program.147 This presents
a particularly difficult situation for a Black LGBT person. While the Black
community has traditionally revolved around the Church, and while Black
LGBT people statistically prefer to remain within the Black community, the
Black Church is often a great opposing force to LGBT equality.148 Out Black
LGBT people are therefore more likely to be rejected by these institutions
than their white peers, even as they live and participate in the community.149
Finally, as previously mentioned, many Black LGBT people feel rejected
by and reject general LGBT associations, which, as a cyclical problem, are
commonly dominated by privileged white members of that community. This
leads to feelings of tokenism and isolation, which decreases BLGBT participation, which in turn perpetuates the dominance of white community members. In this way, Black LGBT couples find themselves doubly shunned from
opportunities to engage in community activities that would qualify them to
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An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1)–
(8) (Kan. 2015).
Id. § 1(b)(1).
See Lowry, supra note 119.
Id. § 1(b)(7).
See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(8).
See Lowry, supra note 119.
See Tonyia M. Rawls, Yes, Jesus Loves Me, in BLACK SEXUALITIES: PROBING POWERS, PASSIONS,
PRACTICES, AND POLICIES 327 (Juan Battle & Sandra L. Barnes, eds. 2010) (discussing the ostracizing of Black LGBT people by their community and faith).
Id.
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be CARE parents. Given the overt and subtle hurdles created for LGBT
and Black communities within this proposed legislation, the compounded
negative effects that these criteria would have in allowing Black LGBT families to become CARE families makes it highly unlikely that more than a
handful of such families would qualify.
This is not to say that the State does not have a legitimate interest in regulating who becomes a foster parent—it makes logical sense to have at least
one parent with a minimum level of education for the benefit of the foster
child. There is also a rational basis for desiring a parent to remain in the
home with the child or children and to encourage adults who are involved in
the community to become foster parents. However, the legislation ignores
cultural differences in certain communities and the general economic realities
that require both parents to work, and removes otherwise loving potential foster families from the applicant pool. A two-parent working household, for
example, does not result in significant negative impacts on children, and so
the disproportionately negative impact that these requirements have on the
certain communities do not seem to outweigh the benefit of diverse foster care
options, particularly in light of the disproportionately high number of Black
and LGBT children currently waiting for placement in the foster care system.
Despite this, the current framework provides no remedy for these families. While a Black LGBT couple may be more likely to feel the discriminatory impact of this law because of its negative effect on both Black and LGBT
communities, their claim is as sure to fail as their straight Black or white
LGBT peers. The CARE Act makes no facial mention of Black people or
race at all, and both legislative and other secondary sources are devoid of any
mention of a desire to limit Black Kansans from participating in the Care
program. In fact, it is likely that there was no racial animus on the part of
the Kansas legislators. Because the legislature did not intend any negative
impact on the Black community, and because the legislative history does not
show a consensus desire to harm a politically unpopular group (LGBT people), a Black LGBT couple would likely be unable to find remedy through a
challenge based on either race or sexual orientation.
IV. A DIFFERENT TAKE ON EQUAL PROTECTION
The Kansas CARE program criteria would disproportionately inhibit
Black LGBT families from enrolling in this advanced foster program while
still operating within the constitutional bounds of current Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence. And while it is likely that proportionately greater
numbers of BLGBT couples would be barred from the program, members
from both the Black and LGBT communities as a whole would suffer as well.
How, then, does an in-depth look at the particular Black LGBT subgroup
add to the discussion or advancement of LGBT equality as a whole?
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First, by looking at the intersections within any group, politicians, lawyers, and judges can more precisely identify the costs associated with a particular piece of legislation to determine if those costs outweigh the benefits
that the law seeks to attain. In this instance, an intersectional analysis shows
that the homes most likely to benefit some of the foster care system’s most
vulnerable children and teens (Black and LGBT youth) will be disproportionately rejected by and deterred from the Kansas CARE Program.
Second, an intersectional analysis highlights the weaknesses inherent in
the current equal protection framework. As noted above, cultural and legal
realities within both the LGBT and Black communities would allow the
CARE Act to discriminate against these families while remaining constitutional. The Equal Protection Clause would protect neither group, even
though the standard of review for LGBT communities is afforded a relatively
low standard of scrutiny while race is afforded the highest that the Court can
extend. Black LGBT families, existing in both worlds, feel this effect more
acutely, and are as equally without remedy.
This is a direct result of the intent requirement embedded within each
level of scrutiny. From Moreno’s “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”150 language to the requirement in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolital Housing Development Corp. that a facially neutral law must be motivated
by a desire to discriminate against a particular group,151 the Court consistently requires that aggrieved plaintiffs prove that legislators intended to cause
the resulting disparate harm that plaintiffs have experienced or will experience if the law is upheld. Too often, the necessity of concrete “proof” creates
an insurmountable barrier.152
Prevailing social science uniformly shows that groups who are distrustful
of other particular groups do not express that discomfort or dislike through
overt epithets as they did in the 1960s and 1970s.153 Moreover, enough cases
have come before courts to put legislators on notice not to include direct
mentions of a politically unpopular group on the face of the legislation or
overtly in legislative records. And, even if a legislator affirmatively advocates
the harm of a particular group, Supreme Court precedent rejects the notion
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United States Dep’t of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
Eva Paterson & Susan K. Serrano, Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye: The Supreme Court’s “Intent Doctrine”—
Undermining Viable Discrimination Claims and Remedies for People of Color, in WE DISSENT: TALKING
BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT 54, 64 (Michael Avery, ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Shana Levin, Social Psychological Evidence on Race and Racism, in COMPELLING INTEREST:
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 97, 99–
102 (Mitchell J. Chang et. al. eds., 2003) (describing how “traditional” racism has given way to
three generally new ways of thinking about racism). See also Paterson & Serrano, supra note 152, at
64.
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that a legislator’s active discrimination in the official legislative record can be
used as proof that the entire lawmaking body intended to discriminate.154
The statements made by Senator Knox present a perfect example of how
discriminatory desire is expressed in today’s society. These statements are
paradigmatic examples of symbolic prejudice. Such prejudice expresses negative feelings towards another group that the speaker believes is in some way
“violating the traditional values they hold dear.”155 When the Senator remarked that “we need normal homes as foster homes. . . . I just mean an
ordinary home with a mom and dad . . . . It’s no secret I’d like to see church
people,”156 he never specifically referred to the LGBT community. However, these statements unfairly exclude the LGBT community from the norm
by evoking well-known tensions between the community and those who
would stereotypically identify as “church people.” While the dichotomy between being “gay” and “churchgoing” is false, particularly in the Black
LGBT community where members generally try to remain in Black communities highly influenced by the church, the implication of intent remains.
The implications of the Senator’s statements may be easily understood to
a reader but are less easily proven to a court. In all equal protection levels of
scrutiny, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving the legislator’s intent.
As lawmakers bear no burden to prove their intent in the first instance, plaintiffs will find it increasingly difficult to prove intent through innuendo, particularly as societial animus evolves to more subtle forms of prejudice.
Equal protection jurisprudence must advance as expressions of prejudices
advance. Legal scholars have for some time been in agreement that some
change to the equal protection framework is needed, but disagree about the
form of course correction.157 However, despite the growing body of legal
scholarship advocating change, it is unlikely that the intent requirement will
154

155
156
157

See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that
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the whole).
See Levin, supra note 153, at 101.
See Lowry, supra note 119.
See, e.g., Sarah Erickson-Muschko, What is the Purpose? Affirmative Action, DOMA, and the Untenable
Tiered Framework for Equal Protection Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 44, 45–46 (2013) (highlighting the inconsistent rationales for applying different levels of scrutiny to different laws depending upon the context in which the Court hears a case); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L.
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tiered framework still apply in the modern context); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 740–41 (2014) (attempting to resolve the flaw of suspect classifications in the modern tiered framework); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1605, 1608–13 (2015) (arguing for the complete removal of the tiered classification framework
to a form of heightened scrutiny based on rectifying a history of discrimination towards a particular
group).
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ever be entirely abandoned by the Court. It therefore becomes vital to find
a way to modernize our conception of what constitutes “intent.”
There are many ways to solve this problem, but it seems that the simplest
answer, and perhaps the most effective, is rooted in Professor Henry Chambers’ 2004 article, Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Speaking in the context of race, Professor Chambers asserts that,
given the malleability of the intent requirement, legislatures should be required to be aware of the obvious logical consequences that flow from their
proposed laws and attribute those consequences to the legislature as if it were
their intent.159 He argues that while the unknowable purpose of the legislature is not irrelevant, the “presumed intent” inquiry is sensibly structured
when courts focus on the discriminatory effects that will almost inevitably
flow from the legislation.160
This solution is most sensible because it modernizes the courts’ understanding of intent while avoiding the inevitable decades of confusion that
would follow if the Court completely overruled the tiered scrutiny framework. Instead of confusion, courts could look at readily-available empirical
evidence of the negative effects that legislation will have on a particular community as evidence of discrimination. Finally, and most importantly, courts
could combat institutional structures of prejudice that evade review.
Some scholars argue that adequate implementation of the Equal Protection Clause requires doing away with the tiered scrutiny framework,161 but
overruling longstanding precedent can have lasting negative effects. Upending the entire framework will create massive uncertainty in state and federal
executive branches, legislatures, and lower courts while an entirely new legal
framework is created. It would destroy forty years of precedent and hundreds
of Supreme Court and State Supreme Court decisions on the contours of the
right, and would retard the equal protection conversation for years.
And yet, change seems necessary, and the Court retains the discretion and
responsibility to overturn unworkable precedent162 or precedent that no longer
158
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Professor Henry L. Chambers, Jr., is a constitutional and criminal professor at the University of
Richmond School of Law. Henry Chambers, Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEM. POL. & C. R. L. REV. 611 (2004).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 620.
See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739 (2014)
(attempting to resolve the flaw of suspect classifications in the modern tiered framework); Lauren
Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1606 (2015) (arguing for the complete removal
of the tiered classification framework to a form of heightened scrutiny based on rectifying a history
of discrimination towards a particular group).
Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–65 (1905) (recognizing economic substantive
due process) with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (overruling Lochner); Pennsylvania
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Gas).
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comports with current notions of good governance.163 The current standards
for proving intent meet both criteria. By maintaining a standard that no longer
defends against current methods of discrimination, the requirement fails to effectuate the Amendment’s goals of maintaining equality. Thus, modifying the
intent requirement to ease a plaintiff’s burden of proof can allow substantive
review of constitutionally problematic laws without eliminating the bulk of
equal protection jurisprudence. The tiered scrutiny frameworks would remain, and a majority of the contours of the right would be preserved.
The most significant change would be a reworking of Arlington Heights,
which first explained the burden of intent.164 Arlington Heights instructed lower
courts to look at specific factors to determine intent, including the “the legislative or administrative history,” which “may be highly relevant, especially
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports,”165 as well as “historical background” and the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision.”166 The Court was also clear that “[i]n many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to
acknowledge the ‘heterogeneity’ of the Nation’s population.”167
An implied intent requirement modifies the Court’s statements regarding
disproportionate impact and adds an additional factor for plaintiffs to rely
upon by allowing them to look at relevant data that was known and readily
available to legislators at the time of enactment. For example, with the Kansas CARE Act, because the proposed legislation lists an assortment of criteria
for applicants, legislators would be expected to know pertinent information
about groups that would be affected by those criteria. Legislators would be
expected to know that LGBT couples in Kansas were formally barred from
entering into marriages with one another before the Obergefell decision and
would therefore be disproportionately eliminated. Similarly, because income
is a criterion, legislators would be expected to understand the social and racial statistics surrounding income inequality, and would be held accountable
for understanding the logical effects of their decisions.
Critics might argue that legislators could not possibly be aware of every
data point that could be affected by a particular bill. The implied intent
requirement, however, does not require this significant burden. Rather, it
requires only that legislators are held accountable for information obviously
163
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Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (establishing that “separate but equal”
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related to legislation. As discussed above, marriage equality and income inequality are topics that were widely discussed both before and at the time of
proposal, and legislators cannot in good faith claim ignorance of those ideas.
Legislators would not be held accountable for other, less apparent, disproportionately negative effects that the law may have. Instead, the burden
would fall on groups most likely to be negatively affected to bring these issues
to the legislators’ attention before the bill is passed. In this way, the burden
does not shift to the legislators entirely, but rather shifts a potential plaintiff’s
burden to an earlier point in time.
Under a presumed intent framework, intersectional understandings of
the different groups that would be affected by new legislation would become
critical and would foster greater interaction between historically marginalized groups and their government. Because legislators would only be held
responsible for the obvious consequences of their actions, the legislature itself
would not have the additional responsibility of conducting in-depth research
on every possible demographic. Rather, analyses like the one conducted
above would be created by interested private-sector parties and presented to
legislatures to put them on notice of the potential harms of their legislation
that they may have otherwise overlooked.
Most importantly, presumed intent would provide relief for plaintiffs who
are currently underserved by the current equal protection framework. Black
LGBT families in Kansas who would be disproportionately rejected from
foster programs like the Kansas CARE program would have the ability to
present their unique situation and highlight the bill’s unfair negative effects
on both them and the larger Black and LGBT communities to a legislature
whose intent can be inferred by what it knew about its constituents, and could
do so without fighting decades of Supreme Court precedent that imposes
unwinnable hurdles for intent.
CONCLUSION
Many scholars argue the merits of extending heightened scrutiny to the
LGBT community with varying degrees of success. These analyses are often
conducted using the LGBT community as a whole to define the situation of
the class. However, by analyzing judicial precedent through an intersectional framework, it becomes clear that the extension of heightened scrutiny
may not provide the protection desired. Rather, one can see that the outmoded intent requirement embedded in equal protection jurisprudence
would continue to pose problems even if heightened scrutiny is extended.
Scholars, lawmakers, and judges should focus first on modernizing the intent
requirement to more accurately reflect the ways in which animus is currently
conveyed by both legislators and society.

